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ABSTRACT
Distingiishing "spot" versus "contract" views of the labor market is of
critical importance to a host of economic issues ranging from wage flexibility
over the business cycle to firm financial valuation. The structural features of
U.S. private pension plans permit surprisingly strong inferences concerning the
incentive effects of private pension plan provisions and the contractual nature
of the U.S. labor market. This paper examines the accrual of vested pension
benefits of a nation—wide sample of pension plans. We find strikingly large
discontinuities in the profile by age of the ratio of annual accrued pension
benefits to the standard wage. These discontinuities primarily occur at the
ages of full vesting and early retirement. Representative plans often exhibit
absolute changes in accrual ratios of 20 to 30 percentage points at these ages.
The provisions of many plans imply large negative accruals after the age of
early retirement. Job change typically involves a large loss in pension wealth
as well. Since the average worker's marginal product presumably changes
smoothly as he or she ages, these pension data can only be reconciled with spot
market clearing if age wage profiles within a firm exhibit exactly offsetting
discontinuities at key ages. Casual inspection of firm wage setting behavior
rules out this requirement of spot market clearing. In our view the magnitude,
patterns, and variations in pension accrual ratios are strikingly at odds with
spot market equilibrium. While market clearing in longer term contracts seems
the only equilibrium theory consistent with these findings, it also strains our
credulity to ascribe optimizing behavior to the pension accrual profiles chosen
by a vast array of U.S. businesses. In the process of presenting these profiles
we also consider the following questions concerning U.S. pensions. What are the
incentive effects of private pension plans? What is the cost in pension
benefits of job turnover? How important is vesting? Is there a cost in pension
benefits of foregoing the early retirement option? Do pension stipulations
encourage early retirement? While the considerable heterogeneity of pension
plan provisions permits no simple or single answer to these questions, the data
suggest that pensions can have major incentive effects on job turnover and
retirement. In general pensions represent a very significant factor, and at
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What are the incentive effects of private pension plans? What is the
cost in pension benefits of job turnover? How important is vesting? Is there a
cost in pension benefits of foregoing the early retirement option? Do pension
stipulations encourage early retirement? By analyzing the stipulations of pen-
sion plans, we are able to develop considerable evidence directed to these
questions. At the same time, the structural features of private pension plans
permit new and potentially strong inferences concerning the contractual nature
of labor market agreements and the role of pensions in assisting such arrange—
me nt s.
Understanding the contractual arrangements between workers and firms is
important for a host of economic issues ranging from the degree of wage flexibi-
lity over the business cycle to the availability of human capital insurance
within the firm. Discriminating between "spot" and "long—term contract" views
of the labor market is also critical for evaluating numerous questions specific
to private pensions. One such question is whether workers and employers fully
appreciate how complex pension plan provisions alter a firm's total compensation
package. Evidence that labor markets closely accord to the predictions of a
spot market would suggest rather small information problems. Equally productive
workers, in this case, receive identical total annual remuneration regardless of—2—
their current employer or the specifics of the employer's pension plan.
A second question involves proper disclosure and valuation of a pension
plan's net financial liabilities. In a spot market setting an employer's net
liability corresponds simply to the accrued value of vested pension benefits.
Additional pension liabilities projected to arise from future employment, in
such a setting, are matched dollar for dollar by future projected revenues asso—
ciated with the w'orker'e continued employmentThe excess of projected over
accrued liabilities should not, therefore, affect a firm's valuation and
suggests no case for estimating and disclosing projected pension liabilities.
Under a long—term contract arrangement, on the other hand, revenue from con-
tinued employment need not match the accrual of future pension liabilities, plus
the payment of tenure wages, and the disclosure of projected rather than accrued
liabilities is potentially more relevant for firm financial valuation.
A third question is the effect of pensions on labor nobility and
hiring practices. In a spot market environment the particular and quite pecu-
liar rates of pension benefit accrual with ae described here would have no
consequences for labor nobility, since offsetting increases or reductions in
direct wage compensation would leave the worker indifferent between staying on
the current job or switching to another job offering an identical amount of
total compensation. A spot market would also entail flexibility in wage
compensation sufficient to permit hiring equally productive old and young, black
and white, male and female workers, despite differences in their accrual of
vested pension benefits reflecting age, race, and sex specific nortality
probabilities. Long—term contractual agreements, in constrast, may leave less
flexibility to accomodate differences in individual circumstances.—3—
Given knowledge of a worker's current and previous level of earnings,
and the benefit and retirement provisions of his pension plan, one could, in
principle, directly test the spot market hypothesis by checking whether,in each
year, the sumofthe increment to a worker's accrued vested pension benefits
plus his wage compensation equalled his marginalproduct.2 Unfortunately, a
worker's marginal product is unobservable and difficult to estimate. In addi-
tion new government data linking pension plan provisions and the earnings
histories of participating workers have not yet beenreleased.3 These data
limitations restrict, but, by no means, preclude inferences about spot versus
contractual labor market arrangements.
While little is known about the typical profile of marginal produc-
tivity by age, it seems safe to assume that this schedule does notexhibit sharp
discontinuities. In addition, while there is currently no publicly available
means of matching particular earnings histories with particular pension plans,
there is considerable information available concerning the typical shape of age—
earnings profiles.
This paper calculates the pattern of accrual of vested pension benefits
for alternative, but realistic, age—earnings profiles. These accrual profiles
are computed for a large sample of plans contained in the Bureauof Labor
Statistic's 1979 Level of Benefits Survey (BLS—LOB). This new pension data,
based on a survey of 1,1469 establishments with 3,386,121 pension participants,
provides extremely detailed information concerning pension benefits, vesting,
and early retirement formulas, all of which are key inputs to the calculation of
pension accruals._14—
The sum of the assumed age—earnings profile, measured in constant
dollars, and the associated real pension accrual profile equals, under the spot
market assumption, the age—marginal productivity profile. Hypothetical age—
marginal productivity profiles derived in this manner exhibit rather sharp
discontinuities at two critical ages, the age of full vesting, for plans with
cliff vesting, and the early retirement age, for plans permitting early retire-
ment on better than actuarially fair terms. For a large fraction of pension
plans making reasonable assumptions concerning age—earnings profiles and
interest rates, we find discontinuities as large as 50 percent of wage compen-
sation depending on the worker's age at hire. An alternative statement of these
findings is that for smoothly shaped age—marginal product schedules, wage com-
pensation must potentially fall or rise by roughly 140 percent of the wage at the
age of cliff vesting and other critical ages to satisfy conditions of spot
market equilibrium. These figures appear sufficiently large to rule out the
hypothesis of spot clearing for a large segment of the U.S. labor market.
In addition to the potentially large discontinuities in pension benefit
accruals, the pattern of accruals also sheds considerable light on the potential
role of pensions in discouraging worker turnover. In many instances even
workers who change jobs with no loss in wage compensation and commence
enloyment in a new firm with an idential pension plan lose a large amount in
pension benefits.
The accrual patterns also permit inferences about incentives that pen-
sions provide for early retirement. Under our actuarial assumptions we find
positive pension accruals on average throughout the work span, i.e., worker—5—
separationat any time prior to normal retirement typically involves a loss of
remuneration in excess of the loss in wage compensation. These findings appear
to differ from those of Lazear (1983), 'who finds that after the age of early
retirement, continued work typically involves a loss in pension benefits. Part
of the difference in results is due to differences in interest rate and nominal
wage growth assumptions. In addition, we do not consider in this paperbenefits
for auplans covered the LOB survey.in particular, all plans used in this
analysis base benefits on wages.
AsLazear's (1983) insightful study points out, the present expected
value of accrued pension benefits represents a form of severance pay for workers
'who choose to separate from the firm. Such severance pay would naturally arise
in contractual settings in which workers are paid (in wages) less than their
marginal products. The severance pay may be thought of as the return of the
'worker's bond which he puts up to guarantee the quality and quantity of his work
effort. As the worker ages the value of this "severance pay" rises according to
our findings. In a contractual setting the implication of our finding of
positive average pension accrual at all ages prior to normal retirement is that
real wages represent a lower bound for the average marginal product of workers
covered by our sample of plans. It is important to emphasize, however, that we
find large deviations from the average, with large negative accruals after the
age of early retirement under the provisions of many plans.
Finally, an additional implication of our findings is that compensating
differentia.l studies of the tradeoff between wages and pension benefits, if they
are to be meaningful, cannot be based on cross—section evidence at a point in—6—
time. To understand the relationship between compensation in the form of wages
versus pension benefits, one must consider the receipt of both over a long
period of employment.
The next section describes procedures used to calculate pension benefit
accrual and presents illustrative accrual rates for a standard earnings—based
defined benefit plan, but one that is not integrated with social security. This
plan is also used to dexnstratê the sensitivity of accrual rates to assumptions
about wage inflation and interest rates. Section II presents evidence con-
cerning age—earnings profiles, suggesting, in particular, that for fully
employedworkers between ages 55 and 65 who remain in a given firm, nominal ear-
nings grow on average at rates commensurate with, if not greater than, infla-
tion. The assumption of positive nominal wage growth after age 55 is crucial
for generating positive pension benefit accrual between 55 and 65. Section III
describes the BLS—LOB data set in xxre detail and examines the heterogeneity of
accrual profiles for our sample of 1183 plans.5 We conclude section III by
drawing inferences from these data concerning the weight of evidence in favor of
contractual as opposed to spot labor markets. Section IV summarizes principal
findings and suggests areas for future research.—7—
I • PensionBenefitAc crualFormulaeand Illustrative Grapof Accrua]
Proflies
A. Accrual Formulae
To begin, consider the benefit accrual profiles shown in Figure 1.The
nominal wage growth incorporated in the top profile assumes moderate life cycle
growth in real wages plus a 6 percent rate of inflation. A 3 percentreal
interest rate (or 9 percent nominal rate) is also assumed. The lower graphs are
based on 6 and 9 percent real (12 and 15 percent nominal) interest rates respec-
tively. In the paragraphs below we describe features of pensionbenefit
formulae that produce the unusual shapes of these profiles.
Vested pension benefit accrual at age a, 1(a), equals the difference
between pension wealth at age a +1,Pw(a +1),and pension wealth at age a,
Pw(a), accumulated to age a +1at the nominal interest rate r, i.e.:
(1) 1(a)Pw(a +i)—Pw(a)(1+r)
Pension wealth at age a is defined as the expected value of vested pension bene-
fits discounted to age a. Intuitively, Pw(a) can be thought of as theworker's
pension bank account. If 1(a) equals zero, the worker continuing employmentwith
the plan sponsor at age a has exactly the same pension wealth at age a+1as an
identically situated worker who terminates employment at age a.Pension accrual
is thus the increment to pension wealth in excess of the return on the pre-
viously accumulated pension bank account.
If the labor market exhibits spot market equilibrium, 1(a) plusthe
worker's non-pension compensation at age a, W(a), equals the worker's marginal

































































































































































































































































































































































































Obviously, if W(a) is a smooth function of age, and1(a) exhibits sharp discon—
tinuities, M(a) must exhibit sharp discontinuities at these same agesto satisfy
(2)
The source of discontinuities in age accrual profiles is clarified by
considering a simple earnings—related defined benefit plan with"cliff vesting't
at 10 years of service. Vested accrued benefits are clearly zero priorto the
age at which the worker has ten years of creditedservice in the plan. Let
R(a,t) denote the ratio of 1(a) to W(a) for a worker age a with t years of
tenure. Then R(a,t) is zero for t <9,If a person age a with 9 years of ser-




In(3). B(a,t) is the retirement benefit available to the worker who terminates
employment with the plan sponsor at age a after t years of service,but who
delays receipt of pension benefits until the plan's normalretirement age. The
normal and early retirement ages assumed for this stylized plan are65and55
respectively.Terminating workers are, however, eligible for early retirement
benefits. Our hypothetical plan reduces benefits by d percent foreach year
that early retirement preceeds normal retirement. The benefitreduction rate,
d, could be greater than, equal to, or less than theactuarial fair rate. Today
most plans offering early retirement appear to stipulate smaller than
actuarially fair reduction rates; consequently, the formulae presentedhere
assume that workers always gain by receiving their vestedaccrued benefits at—9--
the earliest possible date.
The function A(55) is the actuarial discount factor that transforms
benefit flows Initiating t age 55 into expected stocks of pension wealth at age
55. Expectations here are taken with respect to longevity. Thus A(55) is the
annuity value of a dollar's worth of pension benefits to be received each year
until death, beginning at age 55. For simplicity assume that the probability of
dying prior to age 55 is zero. Hence the present value at ageaof A(55) is
A(a)A(55)(]. +
—a)for a< 55. If pension benefits are determined as
a constant A times the product of final year's earnings and service, and there
is no offset for receipt of social security benefits, B(a,t) is simply:
(1) B(a,t) =AW(a)t, and
W(a +1)
(5) R(a,9) =A(l+d)0(1 +rY55— a +3.A(55)lo •
W(a)
R(a,t), for t increasing pari—passus with age, is zero prior to t
equals 9 and jumps at t equals 9 to the value given in (5). Cliff vesting thus
produces spikes in the accrual profile such as that in Figure 1 at 10 years of





and the increment to pension wealth 1(a) divided by the wage W(a) is given by
(7) R(a,t) =A(i+dY'°(l+ (a +'A(55)t[Wa(+)1 t +1—10--
Equations (7) and (5) suggest a drop in R(a,t) as a increases to a+1con-
current with an increase in t from 9 to 10. Equation CT) will be positive if
the term in brackets exceeds zero. This will be the case if the percent
increase in the wage plus the percent increase in years employed (l/t) is
greater than zro. Asstuning the term in brackets is positiveand is roughly
constant, R(a,t) will increase exponentially due to the exponentialdecline in
the discount factor, (1 +
—(a+ asa approaches 55.
If the value of d is considerably less than actuarially fair, a
discontinuity in R(a,t) occurs at the early retirement age, 55. At ages 55and
we have
(8) Pw(55)=Aw(55)(l+d)10A(55)t, and




Assumingwage growth at 514isclose to that at 55 and A(56) approxima-
tely equals A(55), then R(55,t) primarily differs from R(514,t —1)because the
first terms in the bracket in (7) is now multiplied by (1 +d)while the second
term, —1, is multiplied by (1 +r).Since r exceeds d by assumption, R(55,t)
can easily be less than R(54,t —1).Indeed, this change in the functional form
of R(a,t) can produce sharp dropsinaccrual rates at the early retirement age—11—
for a host of pension plans and a range of realistic economic assumptions.
Figure 1 illustrates such discontinuities.
It is important to realize that the early retirement reduction, lower
wages, and one less year of tenure yield lower benefits at 55 than at 56. The
early retirement reduction reduces benefits at the rate d. But if benefits were
taken at 55 they could accrue interest at the rate r. Thus by foregoing the
.-4 ••S4 ZZ 4,4 ---J' .. U SdL V I' £LJ, J. U 0 U.U J.i, C '..'.JO V J0 V
dependson the difference r —d.If this loss is not offset by the increase due
to wage growth and 1 year of additional tenure, there will be a drop in the
benefit accrual rate between 55 and 56.
The same considerations pertain to benefit increments between 6 and
65. Recall that we have assumed a less than fair early retirement reduction so
that benefits accrued before 55 are valued assuming receipt of benefits at the
age that yields maximum pension wealth. The optimum time to receive benefits
accrued between 55 and 56 is 56, between 56 and 57 is 57, and so forth. But to
gain benefits from working another year, it is necessary to forego the option of
immediately taking accrued benefits at an advantageous reduction rate.
Between ages 56 and 65, R(a,t) equals:




Incontrast to the R(a,t) formula in (7) applying to the period between cliff
vesting and early retirement, (ii) indicates that the actuarial reduction
factor-—rather than the interest rate r—-imparts an upward tilt in the R(a,t)—12—
profile between early and normal retirement, as long as the termin brackets is
positive. In (11) as in (7) and (io) the accrual rate, R(a,t) is an increasing
function of the rate of nominal wage growth. Larger nominal interest rates
reduce accrual rates at all ages, with a negative interaction with age prior to
early retirement.
Finally, while equation (T) is unlikely to be negative, wide differen-
ces between wage growth and the interest rate r can yield negativeincrements in
pension wealth after the early retirement age. To a first approximation,the
bracketed term in equation (ii) will bepositiveif W/W +l/t>r—dwhere
W/W is the percent increase in wages andlitthe percent increase in tenure.
It is easy to see, however, that low wage growth and high interest rates will
yield negative increments. Thus actuarial increments after the earlyretirement
age are very sensitive to assumed values for wage growthand the interest rate.
While the preceeding formulae are suggestive of the general shape of
accrual rate profiles, there are few earnings—based plans with features as
simple as the one considered here. In addition to nre complicatedrules for
plan participation and vesting that often involve age as well asservice
requirements, there are a variety of methods of computing earnings bases,
including career averages, and averages of earnings, possibly highest earnings,
over a specified period or number of years. Reduction rates for earlyretire—
ment are often a specified function of age, if not length of service. Some
plans allow no further accrual after a given number of years ofservice.
Roughly thirty percent of defined benefit participants belong to plansthat are
integrated with social security. There are two, not necessarily independent,
important forms of "integration." One involves a "step rate" benefitformula
that uses a different value for the percentage of the product of earningstimes—13--
service for levels of earnings below and levels above specified values. The
second is referred to as an "offset" formula which reduces pension benefits by
some fraction of the participant's basic social security benefit. Many of the
offset plans set ceilings on the extent of the offset. A minority of plans, in
particular, those with social security offset formulae, provide supplemental
benefits for early retirees prior to their receipt of social security benefits.
The supplemental benefit formulae can also be fairly involved, incorporating
both the participant's age and service in the calculation. There are also plans
that use one benefit formula to compute early retirement benefits and a dif-
ferent formula to determine normal retirement benefits. In addition to these
earnings—related plans, a significant number of plans covering over forty per-
cent of defined benefit participants calculate benefits independent of the
participant's earnings history.6 These formulae can also be quite complex.
There are other plans that are earnings related, but provide differing flat
benefit amounts based on the participant's earnings bracket. Finally there are
plans that specify minimum and nm.ximum benefit levels.
Each of these additional features can significantly alter the profile
of accrual rates by age, especially the extent of discontinuities in the pro-
file. Our analysis in section IV of pension plans in the BLS—LOB sample takes
account of a great number of these complexities. Pwo important exceptions in
the current paper are plans with non-earnings related benefit formulae and plans
with supplemental benefit formulae. These plans will be considered in future
research.—l )4
Theassumption of constant nominal interest rates implies a quite
different pattern of pension accrual than would occur with variable interest
rates. Changes in long term nominal interest rates produce capital gainsand
losses on previously accumulated pension wealth that do not directlyaffect pen-
sion accrual. However, as indicated in equations (5), CT),(io) arid (ii),
accrual rates are also a direct function of the currently prevailing long—term
interest rates. A time path of varyinginterestrates around a constant mean
would produce a much nxre discontinuous age—pension accrual profile thanthose
ofFigure 1and other diagrams in this paper.
B.IllustrativeGraphs of Accrual Profiles
Figure2 depicts three accrual rate profiles for a worker who begins
participatingat age 30 in a defined benefit plan similar to that described
above. The plan calculates normal retirement benefits as 1 percentof average
earnings over the last 5 years of service times years ofservice. Benefits are
reduced by 3 percent for each year that early retirement preceedsnormal
retirement. Cliff vesting occurs after ten years. The early andnormal retire-
ment ages are 55 and65respectively.
Nominal wage growth is determined by two factors, a cross-sectional
profile of "merit" increases by ageandan assumed econoniy—wide rate of wage
inflation. The merit profile involves approximately a 50 percent growthin real
wages between ages 30 and 50 and very little growthfrom 50 to 65.The rate of














































































































































































































































































































































































productivity and the price level. The three profiles in Figure 2 differ both in
their assumed rate of wage inflation and nominal interest rates. The 2 percent
wage inflation profile discounts pension benefits at a 5 percentnominal rate,
while the 6 and 10 percent wage inflation profiles use 9 and 13 percent nominal
interest rates respectively.
These assumptions about wage growth and nominal interest rates produce
"vestingspikes" ranging from5 to 37 percent of vages at age bO The inter-
mediate wageand interest rate assumption produces a 114 percent spike at cliff
vesting. All three profiles indicate reductions in the accrual rate of about8
percentage points at age 56. In order to reconcile these profiles withthe dic-
tates of spot market equilibrium one must believe that marginal products rise
abruptly by an additional 5 to 37 percent exactly at age 140 and then fall by an
additional 3 to 31 percent exactly at age 141. In addition, an abrupt decline in
the worker's marginal product of close to 8 percentage points exactly at age 56
that occurs neither prior to nor after age 56 is required for the theory of spot
equilibrium.
One response to these profiles is that straight wage compensation,
rather than increasing smoothly through time, could adjust to rret the spot
market. Figure 3 suggests the implausibility of this view. Here accrual rate
profiles for workers joining the pension plan at ages 30, 140, and 50 are pre-
sented based on the intermediate wage and interest rate assumptions of Figure 2.
The vesting spikes for the three profiles are 114, 36 and 66 percent of the




















































































































































































































































































































































































 is much less conmxn than prior to age 140, Kotlikoff and Smith(1983) report that
over a quarter of current defined benefit pension recipientsretired with 20 or
fewer years of service.7
Figure 3 is constructed under the assumption that theworkers of the
same age receive identical wage compensation. Thus the diagramindicates the
potential loss in accrued pension benefits for workerswho switch jobs, but
receive the same wage compensation in the new job and are covered '•thesame
pension plan. We present below a similar diagram,based on a plan like our base
plan, but without the early retirement option. Inthis case, the loss is
substantially greater.
Figure 14 highlights the importance of the early retirementbenefit
reduction formula for pension accrual. The profile labeled "earlyretirement
option" repeats the accrual profile from figures 2 and 3 based onintermediate
economic assumptions. The "retirement at 65 only" profile indicatesthe pattern
of accrual rates for the same plan, but excludes the earlyretirement option.
This profile could also be labelled "actuarially fair accrualrates" since, by
definition, an actuarially fair early retirement reductionformula produces an
accrual profile that is independent of the age at which benefits arefirst
received.
To the extent that retirement benefits provide an incentive tocontinue
working, the incentive ismuchgreater without the early retirement option than
withit. It is important to realize that the difference is only a matterof the
pattern ofaccruals; forworkers who retire at normal retirement, the total
accumulationof accrued benefits is independent of whether the plan does ordoes




































































































































































































































































































































































In contrast to the "early retirement option," the actuarially fair
"retirement at 65 only" profile exhibits a 6 percent rather than al4 percent
value for R(a,l0) at cliff vesting. In addition there is no discontinuityat age
55 in the latter profile. While these features of the actuariallyfair profile
are less troubling for the spot market bypothesis, the very rapidrate of bene-
fit accrual between 55 and 65 presents other difficulties for thisview of the
labormarket. The merit schedulebuilt into the nominal wage profile ipiies a
quite limited growth inreal wages of workers after age 55.If anything,this
scheduleappears to provide for too much growth inreal wages after 50. As
described in the next section, cross—sectional profiles of earnings 'by age
decline slightly after age 50 for virtually all classification of workers by
occupation and major industry. Since a three percent growthin real wages due
to econoxr-wide productivity growth is abovehistoric averages, one mightrea-
sonably infer that real wage growth after age 55 is belowthree percent. The
actuarially fair profile of figure ,however,entails increases in total real
pension remuneration of almost twenty percent of real wagesbetween ages 55 and
6. Needless to say, it is difficult to accept the spot market implication
that, in addition to productivity—induced real wage growth,workers at age 65
are twenty percent ire productive than they are at age 55.Thus the plan exa—
mined in Figure 14 indicates that the difficulty in reconciling pensionaccrual
rates with a spot market is not simply the result of earlyretirement benefit
provisions.
Figure 5 and Figure 1 above demonstrate the sensitivityof the accrual
profiles to assumptions about nominal wage growth andnominal interest rates.—i8--
Figure 5 repeats Figureunder the assumption of a 10 percent interest rate,
but no growth in wages by age. For the profile with the early retirement option
accrual rates after age 55 are substantially negative, approaching —15 percent
of salary at age 65. With no early retirement option, on the other hand,
accrual rates are always positive. The bottom profile in Figure 1 incorporates
6 percent nominal wage growth, but a 15 percent nominal interest rate. The
intermediate profile in Figure 1 is based on 6 percent wage growth and a 12 per-
cent nominal interest rate. It yields increments at 65 that are approximately
zero. These figures indicate that a considerable gap between nominal interest
rates and wage growth rates is needed to produce negative accrual rates.
Finally, we illustrate in Figure 6 the cost of job change with no early
retirement option. It should be compared with Figure 3. The plans represented
in the two diagrams are the same except that in Figure 6 the early retirement
reduction schedule is assumed to be actuarially fair (or, that there is no early
retirement option). Again, the top line of this graph shows the accrual rate
under our plan for a person who starts work at age 30 (with 6 percent wage
inflation and a 3 percent real interest rate). A person with one job change
would accumulate benefits up to age I] according to the top curve, but then
would accumulate benefits according to the curve labelled "age hi." Note that
no benefits would.be accumulated for the first ten years. The difference in
accumulated pension benefits at age 65 reflects both the difference in the areas
under the two accrual paths and the interest rate used in accumulation of these
flows. This difference could be very substantial, and depends, of course, both






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































note that the loss in accrued benefits from job change in this example is not
due solely to vesting; in figure 6 accrual, in years after vesting occurs, is
larger for a worker remaining on the same job for 35 years than for a worker who
changes jobs (literally pension plans)This lower accrual beyond vesting for
later plan entrants results from the interaction of tenure and wage growth in
earnings based defined benefit pension formulae. To see the nature of this
interaction consider a plan with immediate vesting that pays 2 percent of I irial
year's salary times years of service. For a worker experiencing positive wage
growthwho is employed for say 30years and retires at 60 the pension benefit is
2percent of the age 60salarytimes 30. If this same worker experiencing the
samewage growth were to change jobs each year joining an identical plan his
benefit would equal 2 percent times the sum of the 30 annual salaries.
Assuming positive wage growth, the pension benefit of the former worker which is
based on the age 60 salary will exceed that of the latter worker whose benefit
is primarily based on the lower earnings received in earlier years of his
career.—20-
11.Wage Rate Profiles
To calculate average pension benefit increments by industry—occupation
group, for a given length of employment, we need estimates ofage—wageprofiles
foreach group. It is particularly important that assmnptions about the wage
profilesof olderworkers beasrealistic as possible. Without lengthy longitu-
dinalrecords on individuals, we have no completely satisfactory way of esti-
mating age—wage profiles. The Retirement History Survey (RHs), however, does
provide some longitudinal data for older workers.8 We first discuss evidence
from these data, and then present estimated age-wage profiles based on the
Current Population Survey (cPs) data. For older workers the two sources of data
seem to provide roughly consistent evidence.
The age—wage profiles appropriate for determining pension accrual are
clearly those pertaining to workers staying in the same firm, thus tenure as
well as age should be included in the analysis of earnings by age. Our accrual
profiles also assume full—time employment. Hence, wage rates per unit of time
is the appropriate earnings concept for our purposes. While conventionally com-
puted age—earnings profiles sometimes show a downward trend for older workers,
this appears due, in part, to a reduction in hours worked, and, in part, to the
mix of ftll time and part—time workers in the sample.
A.Evidence From the Retirement History Survey
The RHS data is based on a sample of persons who were first surveyed in
1969 when they were between 58 and 63. These respondents were resurveyed every
two years until 19T9. Table 1 shows the means of hourly wages by age and yearTable 1. Means of Hourly Wages for Non—Self—Employed Males,
by Age and Yeara
Age Year





60 3.14 3.25 3.19
(155) (154) (309)
61 3.05 3.36 3.21
(130) (149) (279)
62 3.12 3.50 3.89 3.48
(125) (134) (107) (366)
63 2.91 3.30 4.10 3.44
(93) (115) (103) (311)
64 3.41 3.53 4.03 3.63
(74) (80) (61) (215)
65 3.44 3.15 3.54 3.39
(44) (34) (41) (119)
66 3.45 3.59 4.62 3.82
(24) (24) (18) (66)
67 3.24 2.83 3.48 3.24
(21) (13) (22) (56)
68 3.85 4.34 4.42 4.17
(14) (14) (8) (36)
69 3.60 2.71 3.82 3.30
(6) (9) (7) (22)
70 3.25 4.45 3.74
(10) (7) (17)






aSource: Retirnent History Survey. Excludes people who say they are par-
tially or fully retired. The number of observations used to calculate
the associatedvalueIs reorded in parenthesis.—21—
for persons who reported an hourly wage rate and who were not partially or fully
retiredin a given year. For a given calendar year, these data in general show
little decline in wage rates at least through age 63 or 613. The number of
observations per cell is fairly small since the cells only include older indivi-
duals who are still working. Possibly those whose wage rates would have fallen
from one year to the next are less likely to be in the sample. Analogous calcu-
lations showing the median of annual salaries of persons who reported weekly,
monthly, or annual salaries, are presented in Table 2. Here again, in the cross
section, there are relatively constant real salary levels through age 613 among
persons who are not retired, although there seems to be some decline on average.
The accrual calculations require, however, nominal wage profiles. From
both tables 1 and 2, it is clear that nominal wages of older workers increased
rather rapidly over this period. A more precise indication of nominal increases
is shown in Table 3 for all persons who reported weekly, monthly, or annual
salaries. The entry corresponding to age 58—60 and the year 1969—Ti is the
median salary increase between 1969 and 19T1 over all persons who were 58 in
1969 and who reported salary figures in both 1969 and 19T1. The other entries
are calculated in an analogous manner. The table shows very substantial nominal
increases over this period, on the order of 6 percent per year on average. (The
entries pertain to a two year interval.) Considering the average increments by
age in the last column, there is some evidence that the increases declined
somewhat with age. At least through 19T7—-after which our sample sizes are very
small——it appears that salary increases for these older workers were in general
keeping up with price increases. The percent increases in the Consumer Price
Index (cPi) for the years 1969 to 1977 were as follows:Table 2. Medians of Annu& Salary for Non—Self—Employed Males,
by Age nd Yera
Age Year





60 7280 8372 7800
(683) (485) (1168)
61 7280 8100 7600
(690) (563) (1253)
62 7280 8216 9850 8008
(591) (453) (322) (1366)
63 7225 8000 8800 7860
(454) (413) (339) (1206)
64 8000 9100 10088 9000
(403) (303) (246) (952)
65 7800 8200 9480 8320
(179) (151) (146) (476)
66 8944 9200 11600 9663
(110) (107) (76) (293)
67 8320 8942 11830 9048
(91) (90) (56) (237)
68 9284 8541 6600 8998
(70) (48) (18) (136)
69 8913 10089 4225 9360
(54) (42) (8) (104)
70 7850 3750 6703
(30) (12) (42)






8Source: Retiranent History Survey. Excludes people who say they are par-
tially or fully retired. The number of observations used to calculate
the associated value is recorded in parenthesis.Table 3. Median Percent Changes in Annual SaJary for Non—SeJf—ErnpJoyed Males,
by Age and Yeare
Age Year





60—62 12.5 12.6 12.5
(393) (264) (657)
61—63 11.7 11.0 iii
(354) (280) (634)
62—64 11.3 11.7 13.3 11.5
(346) (237) (170) (753)
63—65 10.4 11.1 11.1 11.1
(148) (118) (101) (367)
64—66 12.9 12.1 10.5 12.2
(86) (83) (64) (233)
65—67 9.5 12.5 11.4 10.8
(58) (54) (45) (157)
66—68 10.8 12.8 12.9 11.8
(47) (37) (10) (94)
67—69 6.4 10.1 6.2 8.3
(41) (36) (3) (80)
68—70 10.6 29.8 13.3
(18) (3) (21)






asource:Retirement HistorySurvey.Excludes people who say they are par-
tially or fully retired. The number of observations used to calculate











Inshort, these data suggest substantial nominal wage increases for older
workers, roughly consistent, on average, with overall inflation levels.
B. Wage—Tenure Profiles from the Current Population Survey
To estimate age tenure profiles by industry and occupation group, we
matched the May 1979 Supplement to the CPS March 1979 CPS. The May Supplement
provides tenure data, while the wage data come from the March tape. We were
able to obtain the reciuired wage, age, and tenure information for somewhat over
15,000 persons in the 21t industry—occupation groups distinguished in the LOB
survey. Relevant cell sample sizes, however, were large enough to obtain
"reasonable" estimates for only 16 groups, noted below.
After considerable experimentation with two-way tables showing average
salary by age and tenure, we elected simply to obtain least-squares estimates of












where W is the wage rate, A is age, and T is tenure. To estimate wage levels by
age for a person who entered a firm at, for example, age 30 we calculRted—23—
(13) W = + + 2+1(A-30)+
b2(A-30)2
+(A)(A —30)
for values of A between 30 and 65.
The estimated profiles for the total group, and by occupation over all
industry groups, are presented in Figure 7. These profiles are empirical coun—
terpartsof the "merit" scale used in the illustrative calculations in section I
above.
Thecross—sectional age earnings profile (13) for all groups combined
increases by about 50 percent between age 30 and age 52 when it reaches its
maximum. Then it declines by about 10 percent over the next 13 years, or about
.8percentper year on average. Assuming a wage inflation rate of 6 percent
therefore, produces a nominal wage rate for older workers increasing at about 5
percent per year. For older workers this path of nominal wage growth seems to
be in rough accord with the evidence from the Retirtxnent History Survey.
In addition to the graphs of the cross—section wage profiles, summary
indicators of their shapes are provided in Table 4. It shows salary at age 30,
maximum salary, the age of maximum salary, and salary at age 65,togetherwith



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 4. Summary Statistics on Wage Profiles by





















14470 22232 (57) 21454 2.0 —0.4
Sales and
Clerical
10112 14446 (52) 12890 1.9 —0.8
Craftsmen and
Laborers
12228 15366 (51) 13866 1.2 —0,7
Mining 18062 22676 (65) 22676 0.7 -0.0




16374 24634 (55) 23150 2.0 —0.6
Sales and
Clerical
10670 14894 (56) 14380 1.5 —0.4
Craftsmen and
Laborers




21466 25230 (65) 25230 0.5 —0.0
Sales and
Clerical
12284 16806 (48) 13128 2,0 —1.3
Craftmen and
Laborers
13938 17630 (64) 17628 0.8 —0.0




11268 18844 (48) 12620 3.7 —1.9
Sales end
Clerical
8528 11932 (46) 7518 2.5 —1.9
Craftsmen and
Laborers
10974 13538 (49) 11816 1.2 —0.8




13326 19246 (54) 17936 1.9 —0,6
Sales and
Clerical
9230 10822 (54) 10514 0.7 —0.3
Craftsmen and
Laborers
11220 12810 (50) 11950 0.7 —0.4
aSource: May1979Current Population SurveyIII. Accrual Rates from the BLS Level of Benefits Survey
The BLS—LOB (1979) establishments constitute a subsample of the 1979
National Survey of Professional, Administrative, Technical and Clerical Pay.
Based on the file's population weights this subsample covers 17,965,282 private
pension plan participants in the U.S., which is slightly over half of all par-
ticipants covered by private pensions. The subsample's universe consisted of
allfirms withover 100 employees with the exception of mining, construction and
retailtradeestablishments where the minimum firm size was 250 employees and
service establishments where the minimum firm size was 50 employees. Sampled
establishments were requested to report work schedules and information about 11
different types of fringe benefits. This information was provided for each of
the three occupational groups. The BLS—LOB (1979) pension benefits tape con-
sists of establishment records for each occupational group that detail features
ofpension benefit plans covering the particular occupational group in question.
Unfortunately firm identifiersare intentionally excluded from the computer
record;hence, itisimpossible to reconstruct the actual pension charac-
teristics of the initial establishment. The data can, however, be used to esti—
mate industry—wide or occupation—wide values of pension variables.
In this section we examine accrual ratios for 1183 earnings based
defined benefit plans. Earnings based plans account for approximately 80
percent of BLS—designated usable plans from the survey and about 65 percent of
plans weighted by pension coverage.9 Each of the 1183 plans stipulates
cliff—vesting at 10 years, but the plans have different normal and early
retirement ages. Other earnings based plans with different vesting ages have—25—
accrual profiles similar to those that we shall describe, but for convenience of
exposition we have not included them in our analysis here. Of the 1183 plans,
508 are integrated with social security under an offset formula.
Table 5 presents weighted average accrual ratios for the 1183 plans by
early and normal retirement ages for workers hired at age 31. Our intermediate
assumptions of 6 percent nominal wage growth and a 9 percent interest rate are
used in conjunction with the industry—occupation—age-earnings profiles discussed
in section II. The spike at the age of vesting varies with early retirement and
normal retirement ages. It is 21 percent for plans with early and normal
retirement at 55. Among the plans with early retirement at 55 the vesting spike
declines with the age of normal retirement, with a vesting spike of
approximately 12 percent for plans with normal retirement at 60 and a spike of
about 7 percent for plans with normal retirement at 65. For plans with later
early and normal retirement ages, the vesting spike is much smaller, ranging
from a little over 3 percent to about 5 percent.
Atotal of 356planshave the same early andnormal retirement ages,
i.e.,they do not permit early retirement. Forexample, there are 209plans
with both early andnormal retirement at age 55. Inthis case, the accrual
ratioimmediately after vesting is about 5 percent and increases to about 15
percent by age 50. Between ages 50 and 55 the accrual ratio increases to almost
27 percent. A similar pattern is observed for the other plans in which the
normal and early retirement ages are the same, but the accrual ratios just after
vesting are no riore than 1 percent in these cases. It may be noted that these
plans correspond to our earlier description of plans with no early retirementTable 5. WeIghtedaverageaccrual rates for percent of earnings plans with
10—year cliff vesting, by early and normal retirementage.a
Early Ret.
Normal Ret.
55 55 55 60 60 62 62 65
55 60 65 60 65 62 65 65
No. of Plans 209 152 528 78 53 19 8 50
Age
40 .239 .115 .069 .033 .047 .036 .054 .037
41 .046 .024 .013 .007 .010 .016 .009 .010
42 .052 .027 .016 .008 .010 .017 .010 .011
43 .059 .031 .108 .009 .013 .020 .011 .013
44 .067 .036 .020 .011 .015 .031 .013 .014
45 .077 .041 .023 .013 .017 .037 .014 .016
46 .087 .047 .026 .016 .019 .042 .015 .018
47 .099 .055 .031 .027 .022 .048 .017 .021
48 .113 .063 .034 .038 .025 .055 .019 .024
49 .1 .071 .040 .054 .029 .062 .021 .028
50 .145 .086 .046 .063 .034 .070 .023 .032
51 .163 .085 .042 .081 .040 .079 .026 .033
52 .184 .100 .062 .087 .051 .081 .029 .044
53 .209 .114 .072 .101 .060 .103 .032 .051
54 .235 .130 .083 .112 .068 .115 .036 .056
55 .269 .151
:097
.143 .083 .130 .039 .066
56 .110 .070 .163 .095 .146 .036 .069
51 .116 .074 .185 .107 .165 .039 .078
58 .120 .079 .215 .128 .188 .044 .091
59 .120 .081 .232 .147 .212 .049 .107
60 .215 .083 .259 .168 .245 .054 .121
61 .074 .119 .223 .060 .131
62 .070 .121 .252 .066 .148
63 .063 .122 .023 .167
64 .060 .123 .019 .190
65 .052 .121 .012 .216
a Plans with earlyornormal retirement supplements are excluded.—26—
provision, as depicted for example in figure 14 We have not calculated accrual
ratios after the age of normal retirement, but it appears that in most cases
accrual after the normal retirement age is very small and in some cases
significantly negative. Hence, there appears to be a very substantial
discontinuous drop in the rate of pension accrual after the normal retirement
age for a significant fraction of private pension plans. In subsequent work we
shall describe in detail the accrual rates of plans after the age of normal
retirement.
Plans with early retirement typically exhibit a rather slow increase in
accrual ratios after vesting until a few years before the age of early
retirement. There is often a sharp drop in the accrual ratio at that age, with
either limited increases or gradual declines in accrual ratios thereafter. For
example, of the 528 plans with early retirement at 55 and normal retirement at
6 the accrual ratio reaches about 10 percent at age 55 and then drops by about
30 percent to '(percentat age 6. By age65the accrual ratio has fallen to 5
percent. The pattern exhibited by these plans is similar to the one described
in figure 14 for a typical plan with a normal retirement provision.
A comparison of plans with and without a social security offset is
presented in table 6, for plans with early retirement at 55 and normal
retirement at 55, 62, or 65. There are two major differences in these plans:
first, the within group weighted average spike at vesting is very substantial
for plans without social security offset, ranging from 12 to 26 percent and is
very small for plans with a social security offset with the exception of plans
with normal retirement at age 55. In this case the average spike at vesting isTable 6. Weighted average accrual rates for percent of e8rnings plans
with 10.-year cliff vesting and early retirønent at age 55, by normal
retireent age and social securityoffset.a
NormalRet. 55 62 65
Offset w/o offset w offsetw/ooffset w offsetw/o offset w offset
No. ofPlans 178 31 124 118 261 267
Age
40 .258 .084 .174 .024 .120 .016
41 .050 .014 .036 .009 .022 .004
42 .057 .017 .041 .012 .025 .005
43 .064 .021 .046 .015 .029 .006
44 .072 .025 .052 .019 .033 .008
45 .082 .031 .066 .024 .037 .010
46 .093 .042 .067 .027 .040 .011
47 .105 .054 .077 .035 .048 .014
48 .119 .063 .089 .041 .051 .017
49 .134 .078 .103 .050 .058 .020
50 .151 .092 .115 .065 .065 .026
51 .171 .097 .131 .078 .072 .031
52 .193 .116 .146 .096 .080 .042
53 .218 .137 .169 .113 .090 .053
54 .246 .162 .190 .132 .101 .064
55 .278 .196 .218 .156 .115 .078
56 .099 .1 .080 .061
57 .101 .128 .080 .068
58 .111 .143 .079 .079
59 .107 .147 .077 .085
60 .100 .148 .073 .094
61 .096 .105 .076 .071




aPlans with early or normal retirement supplements are excluded.—27—
about 8 percent. Second, the discontinuity in accrual ratios at the age of
early retirement is much larger for plans without a social security offset than
for plans with an offset. For example, among plans with normal retirement at
age 62, there is a 55 percent drop in the accrual ratio between ages 55 and 6,
while for plans with a social security offset the drop is about 17 percent.
The smaller reduction in the accrual ratio at 55 for these social
ann,,r4 +.r r.4 4% en+ ni a v.a o-rvnaa v.a + n a,n, 1 a 4 ,, no Pr,1 1 r.,roflnn a,, en ,rr. ri, n no i %_. ¼* .L UJ '.I 4. 0% J £40 A.±Ik#%..A 0 U%J.,c.i !...fljJSa.&L. 0.0 4. %J_.4..'_J VI 0 • J.J'.. 0.14.0%..VI '.. S 4%.%.. 4. 14
experiencefaster wage growth prior to their mid—fifties, their social security
Primary Insurance .Amount, a key determinant of the benefit offset, grows at a
faster rate for younger workers. This factor plus the ceilings on the offset
amount established by many of these plans means that social security offsets
reduce accrual ratios prior to a worker's mid—fifties by a greater percentage
than after his/her mid—fifties. •As a consequence, the reduction in the accrual
ratio at age 55 is proportionally smaller in offset plans than in non—offset
plans.
To demonstrate the wide variation among plans with the same early and
normal retirement ages, we have reproduced in table 7 the accrual ratios for
plans with normal retirement at 55 and early retirement at 6, together with the
minimum and maximum accruals among these plans for each age. Almost half of the
plans have these early and normal retirement ages. The average accrual ratios,
as noted above, rise to about 10 percent by the age of early retirement and then
fall to about 5 percent by the age of normal retirement at 65. But there is a
very large variation among the plans. In particular, a large number of plansTable 7. Weighted average and minimum and maximum accrual rates
for percent of earnings plans, with 10—year cliff vesting with early
retirement at 55 and normal retirement at 65•a
Age Average Minimum Maximum
40 .069 .000 .388
41 .013 —.025 .072
42 .016 —.025 .081
43 .018 —.027 .092
44 .020 —.026 .104
45 .023 —.079 .118
46 .026 —.028 .133
47 .031 —.025 .164
48 .034 —.020 .169
49 .040 —.021 .191
50 .046 —.011 .215
.052 —.020 .243
52 .062 —.018 .274
53 .072 —.015 .309
54 .083 —.014 .348
55 .097 —.005 .409
56 .071 —.065 .431
57 .074 —.063 .355
58 .079 —.050 .252
59 .081 —.046 .309
60 .083 —.064 .351
61 .074 —.157 .347
62 .070 —.155 .334
63 .063 —.194 .320
64 .060 —.221 .471
65 .052 —.326 .350
a There are 528 plans. Plans with early or normal retirement
supplements are excluded.—28—
exhibit negative rates of pension accrualafterthe age of early retirement,
while othershavemuch higher accrual ratios than the average. For example, at
65 the accrual ratios range from a low of a negative 33 percenttoa high of
about 35 percent.Thesedifferences highlight the potential importance of joint
consideration of wage rates and pension accruals, a task that we shall pursue in
the future if appropriate data can be obtained.
Table 8 shows how average accrual ratios vary across industries. An
importantdifference among the five industry groups is the proportion with
specific early and norma.l retirementages. Approximately 60percentof plans in
manufacturing have early retirement at 55 andnormal retirement at 6,whilein
retailtrade re than 90 percent are in this group. Over 60 percent of plans
in manufacturing on the other hand have early retirement as well as normal
retirementat 55.Very few plans in retail trade, finance, or services have
normalretirement at 55.
Planswith early and normal retirement at 55haveapproximately the
same weightedaverage accrual patterns in each of the industry groups, with a
spikeat vesting close to 25percentand the accrualratio at 55 ranging between
20and 27 percent. The typical plan with normal retirement at age62exhibits a
substantial drop in the accrual ratioat the early retirement age of55.The
dropis about 35 percent in manufacturing and in finance and over 50 percent in
transportation.
Plans with normal retirement at 65 typicallyexhibitan accrual pattern



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































industry. These plans exhibit a drop in the accrual ratio at the age of early
retirement that ranges from a low of 114 percent in services to a high of 35
percent in retail trade. The average accrual rate at 65 is minus 6 percent in
retail trade and plus 11 percent in finance. It is approximately 6 percent in
services and transportation and T percent in manufacturing.
Early and normal retirement supplements lead to widely varying accrual
patterns and we have not tried to summarize them here. We will, however,
present details of these plans in a subsequent paper. We shall also describe in
future work the accrual pattern of flat rate plans with benefits based only on
years of service. Approximately 35 percent of the BLS—LOB pension plans
weighted 1r coverage are of this type. They typically exhibit negative accrual
ratios after the age of early retirement.
B. Accrual Profiles and Job Change
Job change can reduce pension benefits substantially. For 7149 plans we
calculated accrued benefits at age 65 for persons hired at 31, 41, and 51. In
these calculations, we assume that a person does not become vested in another
plan prior to joining the firm. For each plan we calculate accrued benefits
using the associated industry—occupation wage profiles, for each of the hiring
ages. The comparison of benefits of persons hired at 31 with those hired at 41
and 51 is made in two ways. The first is to sum age 65 accrued benefits over
all plans for each age of hire and calculate the ratio of the sum of the
benefits if persons were hired at 41 (or 51) to the sum if the same persons—30--
werehired at 31. The second comparison is the average of the ratios calculated
for each plan, with each ratio weighted by the number of persons covered by the
plan.Theresults are shown in Table 9.
Theaggregate benefits of persons hired at 51 are only about 50 percent
ofthe benefits of those hired at 31. Persons hired at 41 would accumulate
about 80 percent of the benefits of persons hired at 31. There is little
difference between plans with and without a social security offset, based on the
weighted average of plan ratios. Variation among occupations is not striking,
but there is substantial variation across industries. Benefits if hired at 51
range from only 31 percent of the benefits if hired at 31 in retail trade, to 8
percent in nnufacturing. The ratio if hired at 141 ranges from 65 percent in
retail trade to 95 percent in transportation.
Thus job change can impose a very large cost in pension benefits.
While these calculations do not incorporate vesting on one job before changing
to another, we believe that such calculations ——morein line with the
illustrations in section I ——wouldnot substantially alter the order of
magnitude of the benefit losses. Because we used accrued benefits at age 65,
the calculations also incorporate some negative accruals after the age of early
retirement. It may be more appropriate to use maximum accrued benefits for each
age of hire.Table 9. Accrued Benefits at Age 65 for Persons Hired at
Age 41 and 51, as Percent of the Benefits of
Persons HiredatAge 31
PlansIncludedandAge
Sum Weighted Average WhenHiredand(Number Ratio
ef its of the Plan Ratios of Plans) of
All plans (749)






Plans with social security
of f set (261)
Hired at 41 .86
Hired at 51 .52
Mining (20)
Hired at 41 .83
Hired at 51 .49
Construction (7)
Hired at 41 .79
Hired at 51 .48
Manufacturing (346)
Hired at 41 .80
Hired at51 .50
Transportation (86)
Hired at 41 .95
Hiredat51 .78
Wholesale Trade (25)
Hired at 41 .83
Hired at 51 .57
Retail Trade (127)
Hired at 41 .65
Hired at 51 .31
Finance (100)
Hired at 41 .84
Hired at 51 .50
Services (38)
Hired at 41 .90
Hired at 51 .57—31—
IV. Concluding Connuents
In our view the magnitude, patterns, and variations in pension accrual
ratios are strikingly at odds with the view of spot clearing In labor markets.
While market clearing in longer term contracts seems the only equililbrium
theory consistent with these findings, it strains our credulity to ascribe opti—
mizing behavior to the choice of pension accrual profiles. It seems much more
likely that employees and employers rough tune rather than fine tune in their
choice of pension plans, if there is any tuning whatsoever.
In our future research we intend to examine the ratio of accrued vested
benefits to straight wages after the age of normal retirement. Preliminary
evidence suggests very sizeable potential work disincentives after the normal
retirement age because of a sharp decline in pension benefit accrual. We will
also focus on the particular plan features having the greatest effect on accrual
profiles. Plans with non—earnings related benefit formulas as well as plans
with early and normal retirement supplemental benefits will also be studied.
Given the appropriate data, we wish to investigate the relationship between
individual earnings profiles and associated pension plans. In particular, we
would like to know the extent to which wages adjust in accordance with pension
plan provisions. A second important issue is the extent to which pension
accrual patterns affect retirement decisions as well as turnover prior to
vesting, early retirement, and normal retirement.—32—
Footnotes
1.We thankGaryHeaton for masterful and very extensive computer
programming and Douglas Phillips for excellent research assistance.
2.This asswues no other explicit or implicit fringe benefits.
3.We are hopefulthatthe Department of Labor's extremely valuable survey of
Private Pension Benefit Amounts viii be released in the near future.
4.Bulov (19T9) appears to be the first discussion of these discontinuities.
Lazear (1981, 1983) presents empirical analysis of this issue.
5.TheBLS—LOB survey contains 3248 plans of which the BLS labelled 2492 as
?tusable.tf Our naster sample consists of 2343 of these 2492 plans,
although this study only examines 1183 plans.
6.Pensions in the American Econon, Table 4.5.1.
7.Pensions in the American Econor, Table 3.6.5.
8.We nake no use here of the truncated earnings data contained in the RHS
socialsecurity earnings records.
9.The 1183 earnings based plans with cliff vesting account for 51 percent
of plans weighted by pension coverage.—33—
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